Showing posts with label Applocker. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Applocker. Show all posts

Sunday, January 14, 2018

A Critique of Logging Capabilities in PowerShell v6

PowerShell 6 was released couple of days back. PowerShell v6 is the core version, that is, it is open source, cross platform and it is NOT Windows PowerShell which continues to be the default one on Windows. As per this blog by PowerShell Team, going forward, PowerShell core is the future (Windows PowerShell will still get critical bug-fixes.)
PowerShell Team, over past 2-3 years, has constantly improved the security controls in PowerShell. The defining moment was, of course, PowerShell ♥ the Blue Team where the PowerShell Team detailed many interesting features like System-wide Transcription, Deep Script Block Logging, AntiMalware Scan Interface, Protected Event Logging, Constrained Language Mode (with Applocker "Allow" mode) etc. Comparing PowerShell v2 - which comes installed by default in Windows 7 - with PowerShell 5.1 which is the default for Windows 10, the effort to restrict, track and log PowerShell usage on a box is clearly visible and effective.

Having used PowerShell for 7+ years for red team assessments and penetration tests, I look forward to every major release of PowerShell to change and upgrade my techniques and methodologies. With PowerShell 5.1, as an attacker, I am actually afraid that whatever I do on a foothold or launchpad box may be logged and (hopefully) monitored. During my Offensive PowerShell and Active Directory training, the attendees who are industry practitioners and researchers, always appreciate the logging capabilities of PowerShell and try to implement them in their organization's networks.

But with PowerShell v6, PowerShell logging features have been drastically reduced! This is almost certainly because v6 is based on .NET Core but there has been no authoritative word about it. This post is to compare the most interesting logging capabilities of PowerShell v6 with Windows PowerShell 5.1.

Deployment

All the enhanced logging capabilities PowerShell has, can be deployed using Group Policy. But this doesn't hold true for v6! To enable whatever logging for v6, a script RegisterManifest.ps1 (found in the $PSHOME directory) needs to be executed on each machine to register PowerShellCore event provider (PowerShell remoting can be used to run this script on scale). Thanks Satoshi for pointing this out.

The ability to configure logging from Group Policy is much easier to manage and harder to tamper with whereas the PowerShellCore event provider can be unregistered by using the "-UnRegister" parameter of the script.

System-wide Transcription

When System-wide transcription is enabled, all the activity for every PowerShell host (powershell.exe, powershell_ise.exe, System.Management.Automation.dll or other custom host) is logged to the specified directory or the user's "My Documents" directory if none is specified. With proper implementation, that is, forwarding logs to secure storage and correlation, system-wide transcription could be very effective in detecting PowerShell attacks. 

This is how system-wide transcription looks like for PowerShell 5.1 (The execution is using InstallUtil)
PowerShell v6 does not support system-wide transcription.

Script Block Logging

PowerShell v5.1 has two types of script block logging: Warning level auto logging and Verbose logging that can be configured. Warning level auto logging logs known bad/suspicious commands and script blocks and logs them in Microsoft-Windows-PowerShell/Operational log as Event ID 4104 Warning. When Verbose logging is turned on, which can be done using Group Policy, PowerShell commands are logged as Event ID 4104 Verbose.
Yes, there are public bypasses for script block logging as blogged by Ryan Cobb here and here, still, it increases attacker costs.

PowerShell v6 has no automatic script block logging. But when The PowerShellCore provider is created, the suspicious script blocks are logged with Event ID 4103 in the PowerShellCore logs.
 
Interestingly, while testing the warning level logs, I found out that v6 excels over v5.1 and logs less false positives. For example, one of suspicious strings (see code here) "GetMembers" is logged by 5.1 even if it is just executed senselessly.
But in case of v6, the above is not logged unless, there is a proper use of "GetMembers".
I find this very interesting and will have an in-depth look at it later on. May be, it could help in some interesting findings.

AntiMalware Scan Interface (AMSI)

AMSI provides the content of a script tor script block to the registered antivirus before execution takes place. This enables the antivirus to detect known bad scripts and script blocks regardless of input method (disk, memory, manual) and even encoded and obfuscated scripts. I spoke about AMSI at BlackHat USA 2016 and did a detailed blog post.

Fortunately, AMSI is enabled for PowerShell v6 as well. Although, Matt's bypass still works with just a minor modification.
But, once again, since it still increases cost to an attacker, its great to have AMSI in v6.

Constrained Language Mode

If "Allow mode" is enforced for Applocker or Device Guard, PowerShell is restricted automatically to the Constrained Language Mode which restricts Windows API, interaction with COM etc. See Language Modes

That is not the case with v6!

 

Introducing the PowerShell Upgrade Attack

PowerShell downgrade attack is popular with red teams. If you can run PowerShell v2, ALL security measures we have seen are bypassed as v2 simply doesn't support them. Lee provided an excellent guide on how to detect and prevent such attacks. If v2 is blocked or no required .NET version is installed, what to do? Simply run pwsh from your PowerShell session and you will drop in a new PowerShell session (v6 - if installed) which has minimal security features compared to v5/5.1. I am calling it the PowerShell Upgrade Attack :P. On a serious note, please keep in mind that Windows PowerShell - with enhanced logging - is the default one on Windows OS. Also, v6 is not an update, it needs to be installed separately. Windows PowerShell and PowerShell Core can be installed on a single machine and both will work independently.

So, what next?

I hold the PowerShell Team in high regard (for creating such a useful tool, being open to criticism and acting on the feedback) and quite confident (and hope) that they will address these shortcomings soon. Jeffery already tweeted that the Constrained Language Mode will be fixed in 6.1. But, if your production environment is working fine with Windows PowerShell v5/5.1, I would not advise to install v6 on any system (at least not the production ones).

UPDATE (25-Jan-2018) - The PowerShell Core Roadmap is published and there is no mention of bringing Core logging in parity with Windows PowerShell 5.1. Thankfully, the DeviceGuard/Applocker policy enforcement will get fixed.

Wednesday, May 25, 2016

Practical use of JavaScript and COM Scriptlets for Penetration Testing

I have been following Casey Smith's brilliant work on JavaScript and COM Scriptlets. After looking at his work, I started playing with the code. I was interested in developing easy and customizable ways to use JavaScript, SCT files, rundll32 and regvr32 for...well...interesting things. After using some weeknights and weekends, I give you following PowerShell scripts (all available in Nishang):

 

Invoke-JSRatRundll

Based on JSRAT by Casey, Invoke-JSRatRundll uses rundll32.exe to execute JavaScript on a target which provides a Reverse PowerShell Shell over HTTP. Why? Because it is so cool. Also, it is file-less, the client part is just a single command and most importantly, another method to pwn targets :) The script and the client part are intelligent enough to figure out if there is a proxy in use and also to use first proxy from multiple proxies from Internet Explorer settings. Also, based on the method mentioned here, Invoke-JSRatRundll doesn't leaver rundll32.exe running on the target, when "exit" command is used from the spawned reverse shell, so a clean exit. 

The listener, on the attacker's machine, needs to be run from elevated PowerShell session.
This is how it looks like in action:

Start the listener
The above listener provides the following command to be run on a target. Please note that will need to remove newlines:
When the command is executed on the target:
We get a connect back on the listener:
Nice! A proxy aware,  file-less, Reverse PowerShell Session.

The client part (one-line command) can be used whenever we have the ability to execute a command on the target. Below is an example of using the client part with Out-Word from Nishang. Note that the the double quotes in client part need to be escaped by using double-quotes two times.
When a target user opens the Word file and chooses to enable Macros, the listener will receive a connect back from the target machine. Bingo!

One thing to note in Invoke-JSRatRundll is that a window pops-up temporarily whenever a command is executed on the target. It is because of the use of Exec method of WScript. The Run method which provides for silent execution could not be used as it did not return the output without storing the output temporarily somewhere on the target.

 

Invoke-JSRatRegsvr

This script utilizes regsvr32.exe for providing a Reverse PowerShell session over HTTP. Use of regsvr32, the technique which has been termed as "Squiblydoo", has added benefits. regsvr32.exe takes care of proxy by itself, the execution is file-less and AFAIK, leaves no traces on the target after a clean exit. 

The listener needs to be run from an elevated PowerShell on the attacker's machine. This is how it looks like in action:
 The above listener provides the following command to be run on the target:
As soon as the command is executed on a target, using a client side attack, or any other method:
Great!

This script also shows a window momentarily on the target machine for the same reason as Invoke-JSRatRundll

 

Out-RundllCommand

Use this script to generate rundll32.exe one line commands. The generated command can be used on a target to run PowerShell commands and scripts or a reverse PowerShell session over TCP.

Here is how to generate a command. 
Now, if the rundll32 command is executed on a target using client side attack or other methods, the payload will get executed.

During testing it was not possible to execute larger scripts (specially the encoded ones due to the increased length). The added advantage with this script is it can be used with a simple netcat listener on a Linux machine as well. There is no need to run a special listener unlike in the above two scripts.
Start a netcat/Powercat listener. Run Out-RundllCommand with the -Reverse switch:
 When the generated rundll32 command is executed on the target:
Nice!

Also, the execution is silent on the target machine. Please note that this script leaves rundll32.exe running on the target machine.

 

Out-JS

This script is useful for client side attacks. Using this script, we can create "weaponized" JavaScript files which can be sent to a target user to execute PowerShell scripts and commands. Once a user executes the file (a double click opens the file using Windows Script Host, wscript.exe), the specified payload gets executed on the target with the privileges of the current user. The default name of the generated file is Style.js. 

Once again, it was not possible to execute large scripts, therefore, there is no option of specifying a script path. An example is included in the script to execute a reverse PowerShell session over TCP.

Out-SCT

This script generates a SCT file which can be used with regsvr32.exe to execute PowerShell scripts and commands. The default name of the generated file is UpdateCheck.xml. This file needs to be hosted on a web server and the one-liner regsvr is to be executed on the target.  Note that, in case a PayloadURL is provided, two connections are made from the target environment. This first one to pull the SCT file and the second one to download the PowerShell script.

Like Out-JS only small scripts can be executed using Out-SCT. An example is included in the help of this script which explains usage of a Reverse PowerShell session over TCP without having to download a script. 

Usage with metasploit

Some of the above scripts can be used to get a meterpreter session in the following ways:

Create a PowerShell meterpreter payload using msfvenom:

Host the generated payload on a web server.

Using Out-SCT
Pass the URL where meterprer PowerShell script is hosted to Out-SCT.
Now, host the generated SCT file on a web server. When the generated regsvr32 command is executed on a target, this will happen:

Awesome! A reverse HTTPS meterpreter from a file-less execution which is also helpful in avoiding Applocker!

Using Out-JS
Pass the URL to Out-JS.
When the generated Style,js is executed on a target, we will get a connect back on msfconsole!

Using Out-RundllCommand
Pass the URL to Out-RundllCommand.
Once again, when the generated rundll32 command is executed on a target, a meterpreter will pop-up in the msfconsole.

That is all for this post, all the scripts are available in the GitHub repository of Nishang. Hope you liked it. Please leave feedback and comments.

Join me for a two days training "Offensive PowerShell for Red and Blue Teams" at Shakacon, Honolulu (2 days - July 11th - 12th, 2016) - https://www.shakacon.org/trainings/offensive-powershell-for-red-and-blue-teams-by-nikhil-mittal/